
Among the many concerns when Russia invaded Ukraine six months ago was the potential impact on oil production, as Russia is the second-largest producer in the world. While this fear has not materialized, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude is still nearly 25% higher than at the start of 2022. We believe there are three key drivers keeping oil prices higher in the near-term:
- The pending expiration of support from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
- Limited production options from OPEC+ (the 13 countries within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the 10 allied countries, which includes Russia)
- Energy cost concerns in Europe
The SPR: Oil Market Insurance
In 1975, Congress created the SPR, authorizing the capacity to store 714 million barrels of crude oil to protect the U.S. from oil market volatility and ensure a guaranteed inventory of energy supplies. For perspective, based on 2021 oil consumption data, the total stockpile equates to roughly 44 days of oil inventory for the U.S.
The Biden administration has tapped the SPR several times to alleviate high oil prices. The first was in November 2021, well before the Russia-Ukraine war began. The largest drawdown was announced on March 31, authorizing the release of one million barrels of oil per day for six months. Based on Bloomberg data, one million barrels per day equals approximately 5% of daily U.S. consumption, which is a notable amount, but not enough to flood the markets. As of August 19, the Department of Energy has already sold more than 132 million barrels into the market, bringing SPR stockpiles toward a 40-year low.
Figure 1. SPR Total Inventory, Barrels of Oil
SPR down to the lowest level in nearly 40 years
As of 8/19/2022. Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
View accessible version of this chart.
While these releases have helped lower global crude oil and gasoline prices, the March 31 authorization will expire in just two months, and the potential for supply-demand imbalances remains. Since March 31, total U.S. oil production has only increased by 200,000 barrels per day, whereas the SPR has been increasing supply by one million barrels per day. In other words, there has been a modest increase in production from U.S. energy companies after accounting for SPR deliveries. This suggests energy prices will not materially decline without support from other major oil-producing countries.
OPEC+ Capacity Constraints are Real
OPEC+ capacity constraints are real
Global oil markets have remained tightly balanced since the onset of the pandemic, as slow increases in U.S. oil production combined with OPEC’s unwillingness or inability to meaningfully raise output continues to constrain supply levels. Unlike other business cycles when oil prices were above $100, the major oil producers of OPEC+ have resisted calls to significantly increase oil production.
Based on U.S. Energy Information Administration data, we estimate there are few countries with spare capacity to fill the void created by bans on Russian oil. Many member countries are still struggling from both the pandemic and years of underinvestment in energy infrastructure, which has prevented the group from capitalizing on higher oil prices this year.
Figure 2. Oil Production, Consumption and Inventories
Not counting on spare capacity from OPEC+
As of 7/31/2022. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), PNC
View accessible version of this chart.
The OPEC+ meeting that ended on August 3 led to an agreement to raise production by a modest 100,000 barrels per day for September. However, the amount is well below President Biden’s expectations following his visit to Saudi Arabia on July 17 to appeal for higher oil production. That decision in turn leaves oil-import nations, within Europe in particular, in a concerning position due to reliance on Russian oil.
Europe: Still time to avoid a worsening energy crisis
While bans on natural gas remain less stringent, natural gas has become the key focus of the EU energy crisis, as it is the primary power source for electric utilities in most European countries, according to Bloomberg data. In our view, there has been some retaliation from Russia on the pending EU oil ban, as Russian natural gas producers have sporadically reduced or halted shipments to the EU in recent months. As a result, continental Europe is facing an unprecedented spike in energy costs. Natural gas prices have jumped nearly 500% from last year’s levels, thereby increasing electric utility costs by similar amounts.
We believe the current level of energy prices in the EU is not sustainable without the region falling into recession. We can envision three options for Europe’s energy path forward:
- Scenario 1: Cap energy consumption
EU countries could seek to cap energy consumption, as other resources such as coal or nuclear energy would take too long to come online in the near term. While this option could lower economic activity even further in the EU, investors should not expect monetary stimulus as the European Central Bank is expected to raise its policy rate another 50-75 basis points at its September 8 meeting to help combat spiking inflation.
- Scenario 2: Resurrect the Iran nuclear deal
Since 2018, sanctions have prevented Iran from exporting a significant amount of its oil despite being home to approximately 10% of the world’s oil reserves. Just as controversial as lifting sanctions and renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as the Iran nuclear deal) may be, it could also have a significant and immediate impact on alleviating high global oil prices.
According to Bloomberg data, Iran is estimated to have 50-100 million barrels of oil in storage that could be quickly delivered to global markets. Given Iran’s alignment with Russia on the global geopolitical stage, this scenario may be a major tailwind to lower oil prices in the near term; however, the probability of an immediate resolution remains highly uncertain. We continue to monitor any potential breakthroughs on a compromise.
- Scenario 3: Terminate the Russian oil ban
A last-resort option would involve a termination of the scheduled ban on Russian oil imports. This option is a low probability, in our view.
Where do we go from here?
With the coming expiration of SPR deliveries, limited spare capacity from OPEC+ and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war impacting European energy markets, we continue to expect oil prices to remain elevated in the near term. From a technical analysis perspective, $86 per barrel for WTI crude continues to be a major level of support , but we also do not foresee a new catalyst on the horizon that would cause prices to mark new year-to-date highs either. Despite our outlook for oil markets, as well as the tough decisions ahead for the EU, we are not in favor of making significant asset allocation changes, such as eliminating exposure to developed international markets.
Figure 4. WTI Crude Oil Intra-day Lows (per barrel)
Oil price support holding at $86
As of 8/26/2022. Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
View accessible version of this chart.
While the energy crisis facing the EU remains significant barring a near-term resolution, our asset allocation rationale is due in part to the divergence between the European economy and the fact that most revenues from European-domiciled companies are generated globally. For example, the top revenue source for the MSCI World ex USA Index is the U.S. at 20.3%! Combined with Canada, the total for North America is 27.8%, which is nearly on par with all of Europe at 28.5%. Even within small-cap equities, the MSCI World ex USA Small Cap Index generates just 35% of revenue within Europe compared to 84% within the U.S. for the S&P 600®. As a result, consensus 2022 earnings growth for the MSCI World ex USA is still positive at 4.8% and 2.9% for 2023. In addition, major developed international indices have a greater representation from Energy and Materials compared to the S&P 500®, which continues to be a key source of performance.
As we monitor the energy situation in Europe closely, we are mindful of elevated geopolitical risks and their potential influence on our oil market outlook. Despite the potential for continued market volatility, we are maintaining our current asset allocation views.
Accessible Version of Charts
Figure 1: SPR Total Inventory, Barrels of Oil
SPR down to the lowest level in nearly 40 years
Date |
DOE Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) Total Inventory Data |
10/1/1982 |
277633.00 |
8/15/1986 |
504191.00 |
8/10/1990 |
586678.00 |
8/12/1994 |
591672.00 |
8/14/1998 |
563429.00 |
8/9/2002 |
579095.00 |
8/11/2006 |
687845.00 |
8/13/2010 |
726586.00 |
8/8/2014 |
690972.00 |
8/10/2018 |
660013.00 |
8/12/2022 |
461156.00 |
As of 8/19/2022. Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
Figure 2: Oil Production, Consumption and Inventories
Not counting on spare capacity from OPEC+
Production (mboe/d) |
Avg |
Avg |
Avg |
Avg |
Avg 2022 |
2018-2022 |
Implied Spare Capacity |
2018-2022 |
OECD |
29.9 |
31.5 |
30.6 |
31.0 |
32.0 |
7% |
1.1 |
33.1 |
U.S. (50 States) |
17.9 |
19.5 |
18.6 |
18.9 |
19.9 |
11% |
0.6 |
20.5 |
Canada |
5.3 |
5.5 |
5.2 |
5.6 |
5.7 |
6% |
0.2 |
5.9 |
Mexico |
2.1 |
1.9 |
1.9 |
1.9 |
1.9 |
-9% |
0.3 |
2.2 |
Other OECD |
4.6 |
4.6 |
4.8 |
4.7 |
4.5 |
-2% |
0.5 |
5.0 |
Non-OECD |
70.5 |
68.8 |
63.2 |
64.4 |
67.2 |
-5% |
4.1 |
71.3 |
OPEC |
36.7 |
34.6 |
30.7 |
31.6 |
33.8 |
-8% |
3.4 |
37.1 |
Russia |
11.4 |
11.5 |
10.5 |
10.8 |
11.0 |
-4% |
0.7 |
11.7 |
China |
4.8 |
4.9 |
4.9 |
5.0 |
5.2 |
9% |
-0.1 |
5.1 |
Other Non-OECD |
17.7 |
17.8 |
17.2 |
17.1 |
17.3 |
-2% |
-2.0 |
15.3 |
Total World Production |
100.4 |
100.3 |
93.8 |
95.4 |
99.2 |
-1% |
3.0 |
102.2 |
|
|
|||||||
Producers with Highest Implied Spare Capacity
|
||||||||
Saudi Arabia |
10.4 |
9.8 |
9.2 |
9.1 |
10.2 |
-1% |
1.4 |
11.6 |
U.S. (Crude Oil production) |
10.9 |
12.3 |
11.3 |
11.2 |
11.6 |
6% |
1.4 |
13.0 |
Iran |
3.5 |
2.3 |
2.0 |
2.4 |
2.5 |
-28% |
1.3 |
3.8 |
Venezuela |
1.4 |
0.8 |
0.5 |
0.6 |
0.7 |
-51% |
0.9 |
1.6 |
United Arab Emirates |
2.9 |
3.1 |
2.8 |
2.7 |
3.0 |
2% |
0.8 |
3.8 |
Brazil |
3.4 |
3.7 |
3.8 |
3.7 |
3.7 |
7% |
0.7 |
4.3 |
Nigeria |
1.6 |
1.7 |
1.5 |
1.3 |
1.2 |
-27% |
0.6 |
1.8 |
Iraq |
4.6 |
4.7 |
4.1 |
4.1 |
4.4 |
-5% |
0.5 |
4.9 |
Angola |
1.6 |
1.4 |
1.2 |
1.1 |
1.2 |
-26% |
0.4 |
1.6 |
Kuwait |
2.8 |
2.7 |
2.4 |
2.4 |
2.7 |
-3% |
0.3 |
3.0 |
Top Spare Capacity Producers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
8.3 |
|
As of 7/31/2022. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), PNC
Russian oil production has yet to be impacted by sanctions
Date |
Baltic Sea Exports |
Black Sea Exports |
Pacific Exports |
Arctic Sea Exports |
Total |
4 Week Average |
Ukraine Invasion |
1/23/2022 |
1356.00 |
313.00 |
1133.00 |
343.00 |
3144.00 |
2960.87 |
|
2/25/2022 |
1564.00 |
542.00 |
1242.00 |
400.00 |
3749.00 |
3000.13 |
4000.00 |
3/23/2022 |
1043.00 |
521.00 |
1138.00 |
314.00 |
3016.00 |
3299.00 |
|
4/23/2022 |
1669.00 |
850.00 |
1242.00 |
343.00 |
4104.00 |
3322.80 |
|
5/23/2022 |
1564.00 |
704.00 |
938.00 |
229.00 |
3435.00 |
3641.93 |
|
6/23/2022 |
1669.00 |
772.00 |
942.00 |
371.00 |
3754.00 |
3678.93 |
|
7/23/2022 |
1356.00 |
459.00 |
838.00 |
286.00 |
2938.00 |
3220.10 |
|
8/23/2022 |
1773.00 |
626.00 |
938.00 |
286.00 |
3622.00 |
336.43 |
|
As of 8/23/2022. Source: Bloomberg, L.P.
Figure 4. WTI Crude Oil Intra-day Lows (per barrel)
Russian oil production has yet to be impacted by sanctions
Oil price support holding at $86
Date |
Open |
High |
Low |
Close |
$86 Support Line |
9/24/2021 |
71.92 |
74.27 |
69.67 |
73.98 |
86 |
10/29/2021 |
83.98 |
85.41 |
80.58 |
83.57 |
86 |
11/25/2021 |
75.75 |
79.23 |
67.4 |
68.15 |
86 |
12/24/2021 |
70.07 |
73.95 |
66.04 |
73.79 |
86 |
1/28/2022 |
84.91 |
88.84 |
81.9 |
86.82 |
86 |
2/25/2022 |
91.75 |
100.54 |
90.06 |
91.59 |
86 |
3/25/2022 |
105.13 |
116.64 |
104.08 |
113.9 |
86 |
4/29/2022 |
101.38 |
107.99 |
95.28 |
104.69 |
86 |
5/27/2022 |
110.56 |
115.3 |
108.61 |
115.07 |
86 |
6/24/2022 |
110.58 |
112.47 |
101.53 |
107.62 |
86 |
7/29/2022 |
95.1 |
101.88 |
93.01 |
98.62 |
86 |
8/26/2022 |
89.65 |
95.76 |
86.6 |
93.06 |
86
|
As of 8/19/2022. Source: Bloomberg, L.P.